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I AM DEEPLY GRATEFUL for the opportunity to be part of this sympo-
sium to honor and remember my friend Trina Grillo. Trina was an ex-
traordinary human being and a rare and wonderful teacher. I miss her. I 
miss her brilliant mind, her wondrous laughter, and her careful love. I miss 
her courageous spirit and the feel of her shoulder next to mine in the day-to-
day struggle to make this a more just world. Trina always required that her 
friends speak the truth to her as best we could. Because I know her spirit is 
with us today, I will try to speak as plainly as I can about diversity in legal 
education, the meaning of affirmative action, and the ongoing fight for jus-
tice to which she committed her life. 
I began my career as a law teacher at the University of San Francisco 
in 1974. I was one of four new professors hired by U.S.F. that year. Three 
of us, Stephanie Wildman, David Garcia, and I, did not look like who our 
students expected to see when they walked into their classes. U.S.F. had 
never had a Chicano law professor before, and Professor Wildman and I 
were, respectively, the only woman and the only African American on the 
faculty. While a black woman had taught at U.S.F. two years previously, 
her stay was short lived; we were U.S.F.'s first diversity hires. We were 
pioneers integrating a segregated institution, and we were proud to be the 
beneficiaries of affirmative action. I 
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; B.A., Haverford College, 1965; 
J.~., Yale Law School, 1969. Elizabeth Minott provided invaluable research assistance for the 
preparation of this article. 
1. What is now called affirmative action, diversity, and "preferential treatment," began as 
old fashioned desegregation and, in the vast majority of instances, is still little more than a token 
effort to remedy the effects of old fashioned race and sex discrimination. See, e.g., Hopwood v. 
Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551 (W.O. Tex. 1994), rev'd, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) (documenting past 
and ongoing segregation and discrimination in the Texas educational system); CHARLES R. LAW. 
RENCE III & MARl J. MATSUDA, WE WON'T Go BACK: MAKING THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION (1997) (providing a personalized history of affirmative action and its asset to all of soci-
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The student body was as white as the faculty. There was only one 
black student in my constitutional law class that first semester. Later I 
learned that, after my first class, a small delegation of white students had 
gone to the dean to complain that they had been assigned to my constitu-
tionallaw section. They felt short changed that their teacher was the affirm-
ative action hire. I remember feeling a mixture of pain and anger at hearing 
this. They had not bothered to find out who I was, to discover that even by 
traditional criteria I was easily as well qualified as any of my colleagues. 
However, I was not surprised. The ideological assault on affirmative action 
had begun in earnest2 and the legal attack would soon follow. 3 Even at this 
early stage in the integration of the law school world, when the number of 
people of color teaching and studying law was minuscule, the white stu-
dents were familiar with the rhetoric of "reverse discrimination" and "pref-
erential treatment." They feared that our presence would somehow mean 
less room for them. 
In later years, when I welcomed beginning first year .minority students 
admitted under U.S.F.'s fledgling affirmative action program, I told them 
this story of my first days in teaching. I wanted them to know that their 
black professor, who by then had won the school's teaching award and built 
a reputation as an up-and-coming young scholar, understood what they 
were about to experience. They would be asked what they had scored on the 
LSAT, as if that score defined their whole being. Their classmates would 
tell them about a white college roommate with better scores whose place 
they had taken. They would be accused of lowering the standards of the 
ety); Peter Charles Hoffer, Blind to History: The Use of History in Affirmative Action Suits: 
Another Look at City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 23 ~UTGERS LJ. 271 (1992) (criticizing 
the Supreme Court majority in Croson for ignoring the extensive historical record of discrimina-
tion against blacks in the contracting industry in Richmond, Virginia). 
2. The shift in the attitudes of most white Americans toward race relations, the collapse of 
the old civil rights coalition, and the evolution of a ''new racism" marked by the rhetoric of victim 
blaming and reverse discrimination, is discussed in JOEL DREYFUSS & CHARLES LAWRENCE III, 
THE BAKKE CASE: THE POLITICS OF INEQUAUTY (1979). See also LAWRENCE & MATSUDA, supra 
note I, at 46-53 (discussing the historical origins and context of the backlash against affirmative 
action as wel\ as the body of academic scholarship that shaped the anti-affirmative action rhetoric 
and gave the political backlash intellectual legitimacy); STEVEN STEINBERG, TURNING BACK: THE 
RETREAT FROM RACIAL JUSTICE IN AMERICAN THOUGHT AND POLICY 97-175 (1995) (describing 
the ways in which political retrenchment over the last 20 years has spawned "a scholarship of 
backlash"). Kimberl~ Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform. and Retrenchment: Transformation and 
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1331 (1988) (describing increasing 
conservative hostility towards civil rights reforms). 
3. The first case chal\enging an affirmative action program to reach the Supreme Court was 
DeFunis v. Odegard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (vacating and remanding the case based on mootness 
because, by the time the case was to be heard by the Supreme Court, the petitioner was in his final 
quarter of study and no longer faced expulsion). Al\en Bakke, the plaintiff in the landmark case of 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 u.s. 265 (1978), first filed suit in 1975. 
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entire school and told that they were responsible for the declining bar pass 
rate.4 
The message would also come in implicit forms. It might take the 
guise of lowered expectations or surprise at demonstrated excellence; but 
they would hear the underlying message: "You do not belong here." My 
first lesson to them was that this message was false. I wanted them to un-
derstand that these were words in defense of privilege disguised as merit. 
They were as bright as any of their classmates. If separate and unequal 
educational systems had deprived them of skills given to their white class-
mates, these were skills that could be learned and mastered.5 
While they could match their peers at every task that was put before 
them, I wanted them to remember that they were not here simply to play the 
game as it had always been played, adding a sou~on of colorful pigment 
and exotic culture to the world of the privileged. They were here to help 
change the law school, and, when they graduated, to change the institutions 
where they would work: the firms, the boards, the prosecutor's and public 
defender's offices, the jUdiciary .. the boards of supervisors, and the state 
legislatures. They were admitted because, in addition to their intellect and 
academic skills, they brought with them special gifts of experience, under-
standing, insight, anger, compassion, and even love, that are the legacy of 
4. See Lino Graglia, Special Admission of the 'Culturally Deprived' to Law School, 3 
BLACK L.J. 232 (1973) (arguing that special admission policies favoring minorities will result in 
admission of unqualified students, bringing down the overall academic quality of the institutions 
which admit them, and resulting in personal failure and frustrations for the students themselves); 
see also Lino Graglia, Podberesky, Hopwood, and Adorand: Implications for the Future of Race-
Based Programs, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 287, 289 (1996) (echoing, in this later article, as in the 
earlier article, that students admitted under preferential programs are not in the "same academic 
ball-park" as regular admittees, and the obvious result will be "frustration, humiliation, and resent-
ment") [hereinafter Graglia, Podberesky]. 
5. The University of San Francisco was one of the pioneering schools in establishing effec-
tive academic support programs. Jeffry Kupers, Narissa Sklov, and Maxine Auerbach believed 
and proved that students from educationally disadvantaged backgrounds could not only do the 
work but excel. Trina Grillo became the first full time tenure track faculty member to head the 
program at U.S.F., and she was nationally recognized as a trailblazer and authority in the field of 
academic support. Several essays in this symposium discuss academic support programs. See, e.g., 
Paula Lustbader, From Dreams to Reality: The Emerging Role of Law School Academic Suppon 
Programs, 31 U.S.F. L. REv. 839 (1997); Martha Peters, Bridging Troubled Waters: Academic 
Suppon's Role in Modeling and "Helping" in Legal Education, 31 U.S.F. L. REv. 861 (1997); see 
also Charles L. Finke, Affirmative Action in Law School Academic Suppon Programs, 39 J. 
LEGAL Eouc. 55 (1989); Kristine S. Knapland and Richard H. Sander, The Art and Science of 
Academic Suppon, 45 J. LEGAL Eouc. 157 (1995); Paul Wangerin, Law. School Academic Support 
Programs. 40 HASTINGS L.J. 771 (1989); Kristine Knaplund, The Role of Academic Suppon at 
UCLA, SALT EQUALIZER, April, 1994, at 11; Kent D. Lollis, The Academic Assistance Program 
Initiatives of the Law School Admission Council, id. at 8; Paula Lustbader, The Academic Re-
source Center at Puget Sound, id. at 12; Laurie Zimet, The Academic Success Program at Santa 
Clara. id. at 9. 
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struggle against oppression. When they graduated, they would take these 
gifts back home again to their families and communities, enhanced by new 
skills and an increased understanding of the politics of power that is law. 
Just as important, these were gifts to share with white classmates, teachers, 
and colleagues and with friends and allies from other communities of color. 
Their's were the gifts most necessary to the achievement of our collective 
liberation from the disease of racism.6 
A little over a year ago, I was invited to speak at the induction cere-
mony for the appointment of Maria Elena James as a United States Magis-
trate Judge in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. 
Judge James was one of my students at U.S.F. as was her sister Josepha 
James, who is now a highly regarded prosecutor in Alameda County. The 
Federal Court building auditorium in Oakland was filled to overflowing 
with Maria's large and loving family and with people from every walk of 
life whose lives had been touched by this gifted and generous woman. It 
was a multicultural gathering that embodied what is best about northern 
California. When the dignitaries in the audience were introduced I could not 
help but swell with pride. Among them were two Superior Court Judges, 
Martin Jenkins and Peggy Hora, and the U.S. Attorney, Mike Yamaguchi. 
They had all been my students at U.S.F., as had many others in that room. 
On the stage with the other federal judges sat Judge Saundra Brown 
Armstrong. Saundra had received one of the two highest grades in my eve-
ning Constitutional law class. I smiled as I remembered the day that Saun-
dra came to talk with me in my office. As she rummaged through her 
handbag to find a pen, she pulled out a rather large gun and placed it on my 
desk. "Oh, you didn't know that I was a police officer?" she said when she 
saw the shocked look on my face. 7 
6. I have written about the ubiquity of the disease of racism in a society where, even in the 
most benign of settings, our children learn the lessons of white supremacy. I have also criticized 
the Supreme Court's discriminatory intent requirement established in Washington v. Davis, 426 
U.S. 229 (1976), for its failure to recognize this reality. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Epide-
miology of Color-Blindness: Learning to Think and Talk About Race. Again, 15 B.C. THIRD 
WORLD LJ. I (1995) [hereinafter Lawrence, Color-Blindness]; Charles R. Lawrence III, The [d, 
the Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 
(1987). 
7. Before becoming a federal judge, Saundra Armstrong served as Deputy District Attorney 
in Alameda County (1978-79,1980-82), a trial attorney in the Department of Justice (1982-83), a 
Commissioner on the Consumer Product Safety Commission (1983-86), and a Commissioner on 
the United States Parole Commission (1986-89). For Judge Armstrong's resume see I Almanac of 
the Federal Judiciary, Ninth Circuit 27-29. Ironically, Judge Armstrong's extremely successful 
career in public service may have been the indirect consequence of racial discrimination in San 
Francisco's private bar. I remember Saundra coming to speak to me about her disappointment 
when, despite her almost straight A average, she did not receive an offer from an elite law firm 
with which she had interviewed. 
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These individuals, and many others like them, have changed the face 
of San Francisco's and the nation's bar. They were part of a generation of 
minority and women students who came to this law school in the early 
years of affirmative action. They ignored the many messages that told them 
they did not belong, and they became valued members of this community. 
They founded the Black American Law Students Association (BALSA), 
LaRaza, the Asian-Pacific American Law Students Association (APALSA), 
and the Women's Law Association. They made life-long friends from all 
races. And when Allan Bakke filed his "reverse discrimination" suit, 
launching the first full scale assault against affirmative action, they were in 
the front lines of resistance against that assault. They marched and held 
rallies and had teach-ins. They signed petitions and helped draft amicus 
briefs. When U.S.F.'s dean submitted a proposal to the faculty that would 
have decreased the number of minority students by half, a coalition of 
Black, Latino, Asian, and progressive white students drafted a counter pro-
posal and staged a demonstration that forced us to move the faculty meeting 
across the street to a gymnasium to accommodate the crowd.s An under-
standing of what would be lost if these doors were once again shut to peo-
ple of color and a deep commitment to the struggle for racial justice were 
their gifts to their teachers and classmates. The struggle itself was a critical 
part of the education that made them what they are today. 
On October 12, 1977, the United States Supreme Court heard oral ar-
guments in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.9 In cities 
across the country, multiracial crowds of young people raised placards and 
chanted "We Won't Go Back," putting the Court and the world on notice: 
Whatever the outcome of the case, the struggle would continue. The protes-
ters would not accept a return to the days when they and their communities 
were excluded from institutions of power and privilege. 
When the Court announced its decision, it was sharply divided. Four 
Justices voted to strike down the University of California medical school's 
affirmative action program and order Allan Bakke's admission. Another 
four justices voted to uphold the U.c. Davis admissions program. 
Justice Lewis F. Powell cast the deciding vote in an opinion that strad-
dled the two camps in the Court and struck a compromise between the 
forces for and against affirmative action. He agreed with four of his col-
leagues that Bakke had been wronged by the medical school, but he agreed 
with the other four that it was legitimate to use race as a factor iri selecting 
8. See ERIC ABRAHAMSON, THE UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO SCHOOL OF LAW: A HIS-
TORY 1912-1987 112 (1987). 
9. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
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applicants. 1O Powell's opinion said that all racial classifications "are sus-
pect" and can only be justified if necessary to achieve a "compelling state 
interest."1l Remedying past societal discrimination was not such a compel-
ling interest, he said. 12 Societal discrimination was "too amorphous,"J3 but 
a court, a legislature, or a government agency could consider race in order 
to remedy specifically identified past discriminatory acts that violated the 
law. 14 
Furthermore, a university could consider race in admissions if it was 
essential to the creation of a diverse student body.15 A university faculty, he 
argued, had a compelling interest in exercising its First Amendment right to 
academic freedom; the freedom to select a student body of its choosing was 
part of that right. If a university faculty believed that a racially diverse stu-
dent body was important to its students' education, and it could only 
achieve such a student body if it considered the race of applicants, then it 
was constitutional to consider the race of an applicant as one of many fac-
tors in the admissions process. 16 
Almost twenty years after the Supreme Court announced its decision 
in Bakke, we are in the midst of another assault on affirmative action. Here, 
in California, the anti-affirmative action attack began with the University of 
California Regents' ban on affirmative action in the nation's largest public 
university. Shortly thereafter, the voters of California passed Proposition 
209, which seeks to amend the California Constitution to outlaw race and 
gender based affirmative action in all public agencies. 17 In Texas, a Fifth 
10. See id. at 315-20. 
II. Justice Powell stated: "Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect 
and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination." Id. at 291. 
12. See id. at 305-06. 
13. Id. at 307. 
14. See id. at 307-08. 
15. See id. at 311. 
16. The Court in Bakke commented on a diverse student body, stating: 
The atmosphere of 'speculation, experiment, and creation'-so essential to higher 
education-is widely believed to be promoted by a diverse student body. As the Court 
noted in Keyishian, it is not too much to say that the '[N]ation's future depends upon 
leaders trained through wide exposure' to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as 
this Nation of many peoples. 
Thus in arguing that its universities must be accorded the right to select those stu-
dents who will contribute the most to the 'robust exchange of ideas' petitioner invokes a 
countervailing constitutional interest, that of the First Amendment. In this light, peti-
tioner must be viewed as seeking to achieve a goal that is of paramount importance in 
the fulfillment of its mission. 
Id. at 312-313 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967». 
17. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(a); see also Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. 
Supp. 1480 (N.D. Cal. 1996), rev'd, i 10 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir. 1997). See generally, Erwin Chemer-
insky, The Impact of the Proposed California Civil Rights Initiative, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
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Circuit Court of Appeals panel invalidated the admissions program at that 
state's flagship university law school,18 and once again the op-ed pages and 
the talk shows are filled with the old and familiar rhetoric of "racial prefer-
ence," "anti-merit," "quota," "stigma," and "reverse discrimination." The 
Supreme Court has severely limited the scope of affirmative action in the 
workplace by its decisions in City of Richmond v. Croson19 and Adarand v. 
Pena,20 and, although the Court did not grant certiorari in Hopwood, some 
are predicting the end of affirmative action in higher education.21 
I. The Future of Racial Diversity As a Compelling Interest 
What is the future of affirmative action in higher education and in our 
law schools? Many people believe the answer to that question lies in 
Bakke's meaning and in its fate. Did the Bakke Court set out a justification 
for affirmative action in education that is distinguishable from the Court's 
decisions invalidating contracting set-asides in Croson and Adarand? If so, 
is that justification still viable given the current composition of the Supreme 
Court? 
Opponents of affirmative action contend that Bakke is dead. They ar-
gue that Croson and Adarand make clear that the only compelling interest 
that justifies race conscious affirmative action is the remedy of the continu-
999 (1996) (assessing only the impact of the California Civil Rights Initiative on women and 
minorities and not on its constitutionality); Sam Gideon Anson. Indecent Proposal: The Selling of 
CCRI. How Proposition 209 Evolved From Crusade to Wedge Issue. L.A. WEEKLY. Nov. I. 
1996. at 34; Ken Chavez. Affirmative Action Ban Wins. SACRAMENTO BEE. Nov. 6. 1996. at AI. 
18. See Hopwood v. Texas. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.). cert. denied. 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996). 
19. 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (striking down Richmond's plan requiring prime contractors 
awarded city construction contracts to sub-contract at least 30% of the dollar amount to one or 
more minority business enterprises). 
20. 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (holding that a federal program designed to provide highway con-
tracts to disadvantaged business enterprises must withstand strict scrutiny). 
21. See, e.g., Robert Alt, Toward Equal Protection: A Review of Affirmative Action. 36 
WASHBURN LJ. 179. 189. 194 n.95 (1997) (arguing that Hopwood, Taxman. and Proposition 209 
together form part of a national movement against preferential policies and adding that after Hop-
wood, when the Fifth Circuit rejected past discrimination as a viable defense for such a preferen-
tial policy, despite the long proven record of discrimination in Texas. in the future it will be very 
hard to use past discrimination effectively as a defense for affirmative action policies); Jim Chen. 
Diversity and Damnation. 43 UCLA L. REv. 1839 (1996) (arguing that diversity must be justified 
on First Amendment grounds as well as Equal Protection grounds. and that all such justifications 
must fail. because attempting to create diversity on campus through affirmative action programs 
conflicts with the fundamental free speech values of the First Amendment); Graglia, Podberesky. 
supra note 4 (arguing that the holdings in Podberesky, Hopwood, and Adarand. indicate increased 
skepticism and stricter scrutiny towards racial preference programs by courts. and that this stiffen-
ing of opinion will eventually lead to the elimination of all such programs). 
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ing effects of specifically identified past discrimination,22 and that such re-
medial programs must be narrowly tailored to that purpose.23 Thus, in 
Hopwood, the Fifth Circuit opined that "the purpose of achieving a diverse 
student body is not a compelling interest. "24 The court noted that Supreme 
Court decisions after Bakke "state that non-remedial state interests will 
never justify racial classifications,"25 and insisted that "classification of per-
sons on the basis of race for the purpose of diversity frustrates, rather than 
facilitates, the goals of equal protection."26 
By contrast, affirmative action's supporters have looked to Powell's 
Bakke decision for the salvation of affirmative action in higher education. 
They have argued that Croson and Adarand have not overruled Bakke, and 
that Powell's diversity reasoning is uniquely applicable to the educational 
setting where the pedagogic purposes of affirmative action, flexible 
processes of admissions, and faculty hiring distinguish it from the contract 
set -aside cases. 27 
22. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 952-55; Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 153, 155 (4th Cir. 
1994) (en banc), reh'g denied, 46 F.3d 5 (4th Cir. 1994), cen. denied, 514 U.S. 1128 (1995); see 
also Chen, supra, note 21, at 1857-58; Graglia, Podberesky, supra note 4, at 292, 293. 
23. See Podberesky, 38 F.3d at 153, 158. 
24. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944. 
25. [d. 
26. [d. 
27. One strategy for defending affinnative action programs in university admissions and 
hiring has been to accept Justice Powell's proffered compromise and rely upon his distinction 
between a faculty'S pedagogic interest in diversity and its interest in remedying past societal dis-
crimination. If the use of race to achieve educational diversity can be distinguished from race 
conscious policies designed to integrate the work place or give minorities greater access to gov-
ernment contracts, then university programs might be saved from the increasingly fatal strict scru-
tiny to which the latter have been subjected. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, 
Bakke's Fate, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1745 (1996). 
Amar and Katyal, in an article that is both a careful examination of the doctrinal precedent 
and a thoughtful consideration of the policy-based and structural arguments for diversity, see the 
vision of university diversity as ''the heart and soul of Bakke." [d. at 1750. They argue that the 
most important distinction between contracting set-asides and education is that set-asides can 
"balkanize" and "encourag[e] segregation" while education "unites people from different walks of 
life." [d. at 1749. "Integrated education ... does not just benefit minorities-it advantages all 
students in a distinctive way, by bringing rich and poor, black and white, urban and rural, together 
to teach and learn from each other as democratic equals." [d. 
Amar and Katyal's otherwise powerful argument for the benefits of racially integrated 
schooling is diminished by their need to maintain Powell's dichotomy between the forward look-
ing purpose of diversity (learning about and from one another) and the backward looking purpose 
of rectifying societal racism. See id. at 1776. For example, they speak of "bringing elements of 
society into a ... common conversation" without noting that our nation's historical and contempo-
rary racism must be a primary subject of that conversation. They argue further that Brown v. 
Board of Education's mandate that segregated schools be dismantled makes education "sui 
generis," and, even if affinnative action is unconstitutional in other areas, schools may take race 
into account to bring races together. See id. at 1775. They note that Powell is careful to distinguish 
this special role for education from the "broad remediation of 'societal discrimination.'" [d. But if 
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As an advocate of affirmative action, I have argued not just for the 
maintenance of affirmative action but for its expansion.28 I stand in solidar-
ity with my academic colleagues and with the public interest bar who pur-
sue what they no doubt see as the most pragmatic strategy for saving 
affirmative action in higher education: to separate the fight for integration 
in the university from the doctrinally undermined fight for integration in the 
workplace and to distinguish the diversity rationale from the remedial ra-
tionale. But I believe that this distinction is misconceived. The diversity 
rationale is inseparable from the purpose of remedying our society's racism. 
More importantly, I believe that this seemingly "pragmatic" approach 
is a misguided strategy. In the end, the fight for affirmative action in our 
universities and in our workplaces is a political struggle. To rely upon the 
formalism of legal doctrine to save university affirmative action will only 
further entrench existing regimes of race, gender, and class privilege.29 
My purpose here is to articulate a deeper meaning for diversity. I argue 
that diversity cannot be an end in itself-it is substanceless. It has no inher-
ent meaning and cannot be a compelling interest unless we ask the prior 
question: diversity to what purpose? The answer to this question is that we 
seek racial diversity in our student bodies and faculties because a central 
mission of the university must be the eradication of America's racism. We 
cannot pursue that mission without the collaboration of significant numbers 
of those who have experienced and continue to experience racial subordina-
tion. This freedom-fighting purpose may be only one of several reasons for 
seeking racial diversity in the academy, but it should be the primary one. 
Once articulated, it makes apparent the necessary connection between af-
firmative action's backward-looking purpose of remedying the effects of 
our nation's history of slavery and racial apartheid and its forward-looking 
Brown made school integration a special case, it was because segregated schools were where 
black and white children learned the societal lesson of white supremacy and black inferiority. 
Therefore, schools were where that message should be unlearned. See Charles R. Lawrence III, If 
He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campuses, 1990 DUKE LJ. 431 (1990) 
(arguing that Brown should be understood to hold that segregation violates the equal protection 
clause because it conveys the defamatory message of black inferiority). 
28. See LAWRENCE & MATSUDA, supra note 1. The authors offer: 
a vision of affirmative action that includes those disadvantaged by class, as well as those 
excluded for other social reasons, including homophobia. Nondiscrimination is not 
enough when powerful state-supported forces systematically keep some people out of 
the social world: devalued, silenced, casually violated. In a time when many say affirm-
ative action has gone too far, we say it has not gone far enough and argue for aggressive 
expansion of existing programs. 
ld. at 7. 
29. See id. at 41-58. 
766 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vo\. 31 
purpose of preparing students for the work of fighting the disease of racism 
and creating a better world.30 
II. The Shallow Meaning of Diversity 
I begin by revisiting Justice Powell's Bakke opinion. Two aspects of 
that opinion contribute to a shallow and ultimately retrogressive under-
standing of diversity. The first is Powell's division of the state's judicial 
interests into backward-looking and forward-looking affirmative action.3l 
The second is his argument that the school's interest in racial diversity is 
grounded in its first amendment rights to free speech. 32 
Powell saw two university interests in race-conscious admissions: (1) 
remedial interests, where affirmative action is intended to provide redress 
for or correct the effects of past harms,33 and (2) institutional interests, 
where affirmative action's purpose is the achievement of the university's 
pedagogical goals of transmitting certain information, ideas, and mores.34 
Powell believed remedial affirmative action is appropriate only when fault 
is established and a blameworthy perpetrator identified.35 Affirmative ac-
tion in pursuit of the university's academic interest in diversity is more 
easily justified and survives strict scrutiny unless quotas are employed.36 By 
de-coupling these two interests and treating them differently, Powell failed 
to recognize that they are two sides of the same coin. The institutional inter-
est in racial diversity is compelling because the university must have a ra-
cially diverse student body to play its part in remedying historic societal 
racism. It is the experience of societal racism that makes students of color 
uniquely qualified to participate in this institutional enterprise. 
m. The ''Big Lie": Limiting Remedies for Historical Racism 
For Powell, remedial, or backwards-looking, affirmative action is only 
permissible when it is designed to correct identified instances of past dis-
30. See Kathleen M. SuIlivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 
100 HARV. L. REv. 78 (1986). SuIlivan argues that the Supreme Court has only approved affinna-
tive action as a remedy for past discrimination, but has refused to justify it as a path to a "racially 
integrated future." [d. at 80. The result, she says, is that in the Court's view, "affinnative action 
should be compensatory only, not 'affinnative' at all." [d. at 86. 
31. See discussion infra Part III. 
32. See discussion infra Part IV. 
33. See Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307, 311-13 (1978). 
34. See id. at 313. 
35. See id. at 301,310. 
36. See id. at 316-19. 
Summer 1997] TRINA GRILLO SYMPOSIUM 767 
crimination.37 Societal discrimination is too "amorphous."38 Today's white 
applicant should not be held responsible for the sins of the distant past. 39 
We are a "nation of minorities,"40 Powell argued, most of whom have been 
discriminated against at some point in our history. Justice O'Connor em-
braced the idea of a limited use of remedial affirmative action in her major-
ity opinions in Croson and Adarand and it is the view of a majority of the 
court today.41 
. Alan Freeman called this view of antidiscrimination law the "perpetra-
tor perspective."42 It is a model of equal protection that was firmly estab-
lished by the discriminatory intent requirement of Washington v. Davis.43 
No matter how extensive the tangible evidence of continuing effects of past 
racism, there is no legally cognizable harm unless a blameworthy perpetra-
tor is identified and shown to have caused the injury.44 For constitutional 
purposes, this perpetrator must also be a state actor.45 By this judicial 
sleight of hand, the injuries of past and contemporary discrimination are 
transformed into no injury at all.46 
I call this "the Big Lie." Despite overwhelming evidence of continuing 
racial discrimination,47 the Court tells us our nation has overcome its ra-
cism.48 To believe this we must accept a formal and extremely narrow defi-
37. See id. at 307-09. 
38. See id. at 307. 
39. See id. 
40. Id. at 292. 
41. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); City of Richmond v. 
I.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469, 499 (1989). 
42. Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination 
Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049, 1052-54 (1978). 
43. 426 U.S. 229, 238-42 (1976); see also Freeman, supra note 42, at 1052-57. 
44. 426 U.S. at 238-42. See generally Freeman, supra note 42 (arguing that civil rights law 
in the twenty-five years after Brown has served more to rationalize the continuing effects of racial 
discrimination than to produce any genuine liberation from race and class oppression); Charles R. 
Lawrence III, 'Justice' or 'Just Us': Racism and the Role of Ideology, 35 STAN. L. REV. 831, 
848-850 (1983) [hereinafter Lawrence, 'Justice'] (arguing that the equal protection doctrine pro-
motes an ideological imagery that fosters racism). 
45. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). 
46. For a discussion of how the state action doctrine and the discriminatory intent require-
ment in Washington v. Davis transform the real life injury of racial discrimination into the absence 
of race discrimination, see Freeman, supra note 42. See also Lawrence, 'Justice,' supra note 44, at 
847-848. 
47. The recently formed Presidential Advisory Board on Race has called the problem "'vir-
tually intractable,' .. and has noted that it continues to influence almost all aspects of American life 
including policies regulating the economy, education, health, even the environment. See Board 
Hopes to Destroy 'Intractable'Racism: U.S. Must Upgrade its Worst Schools, Open Marketplace, 
ARIZ. REpUBLIC, July 15, 1997, at A3. 
48. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 552 (Marshall, I., dissenting) (agreeing that the Court believes 
our nation has overcome its racism). 
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nition of racism: only self-professed bigots are racists and none of us is 
responsible for perpetuating even very recent white supremacy. The big lie 
is seductive because most Americans want to believe it is true. Powell's 
restriction on backward-looking affirmative action incorporates the big lie 
into affirmative action doctrine.49 
The recent Fifth Circuit decision in Hopwood v. Texas50 is an example 
of Powell's restriction on remedial affirmative action taken to its logical 
extreme. Cheryl Hopwood and three other rejected white applicants sued 
the University of Texas Law School, claiming that the school's affirmative 
action admissions program violated their constitutional right to' equal pro-
tection of the laws.51 Like Allen Bakke, they argued that the program 
amounted to reverse discrimination because their scores on traditional ad-
missions criteria were higher than those of most Black and Mexican Ameri-
can applicants. 52 
A federal district court held that a revised version of the law school 
admissions program, that considered race as a plus, was constitutional be-
cause it was necessary to remedy the continuing effects of a history of offi-
cial discrimination in primary, secondary, and higher education in Texas.53 
This discrimination was "well documented in history books, case law, and 
the state's legislative history" said the District Court, and it was "not a relic 
of the past."54 In 1994, desegregation lawsuits remained pending against 
over forty different Texas school districts. 55 Although the public school 
population in Texas was approximately half white and half minority, the 
vast majority of both white and minority students attended schools that 
were segregated in fact, if not by law. 56 The high school graduation rate for 
Whites was 81.5% compared to 66.1 % for Blacks and 44.6% for 
Hispanics.57 . 
The Office of Civil Rights (OCR) in the United States Department of 
Education investigated Texas universities between 1978 and 1980 and 
found that Texas had "failed to eliminate vestiges of its former de jure ra-
49. See LAWRENCE & MATSUDA, supra note I, at 67-87 (discussing how the argument 
against affirmative action is premised upon a denial of the existence of past and continuing ra-
cism); see also Lawrence, Color-Blindness, supra note 6, at 3-9. 
50. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) 
51. See id. at 938. 
52. See id. at 937. 
53. See Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 578 (W.O. Tex. 1994), rev'd, 78 F.3d 932 
(5th Cir. 1996). 
54. [d. at 554. 
55. See id. 
56. See id. 
57. See id at 554 n.3. 
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cially dual system ... which segregated blacks and whites .... "58 and that 
there were strong indications of discrimination against Hispanics. In 1994, 
Texas had still not satisfied the OCR that it had eliminated its segregated 
system of public higher education. 59 
Cheryl Hopwood and her co-plaintiffs appealed the district court's rul-
ing to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.60 In the 1960s, this deep-south 
court was known for its fearless and heroic judges, white southerners who 
dared to enforce the rights of blacks in the face of ostracism by their own 
communities and threats from the Klan and the White Citizens Council.61 
These men understood that the south they loved must face up to its racism 
before it could be healed of it. In contrast, the Fifth Circuit of the 1990s was 
dominated by conservative judges committed to turning back the constitu-
tional clock to a time before the liberal Warren Court had set a racial 
revolution in motion. All three of the judges on the panel that heard the 
Hopwood appeal were Reagan and Bush appointees,62 and, not surprisingly, 
they voted to reverse the district court and declare the Texas admissions 
program unconstitutional. 63 
The opening sentences of the Fifth Circuit opinion reversing the dis-
trict court were typical of the upside-down rhetoric of "reverse 
discrimination. " 
[I]n order to increase the enrollment of certain favored classes of minor-
ity students, the University of Texas School of Law discriminates in 
favor of those applicants by giving substantial racial preferences in its 
admissions program. The beneficiaries of this system are blacks and 
Mexican Americans, to the detriment of whites and non-preferred 
minorities.64 
According to the circuit court judges, Black and Mexican American benefi-
ciaries of affirmative action were a ''favored class." In fact, the University 
of Texas had instituted affirmative action precisely because these minority 
groups were disfavored by traditional University admissions practices and 
by historical and contemporary racial discrimination in the Texas educa-
tional system. 
58. [d. at 556. 
59. See id. at 556-57. 
60. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). 
61. See generally JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES (University of Alabama Press 1990) 
(1981); J.W. PELTASON. FIFIY-EIGHT LoNELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND SCHOOL 
DEsEGREGATION (1961); FRANK T. READ & Lucy S. MCGOUGH, LET THEM BE JUDGED: THE 
JUDICIAL INTEGRATION OF THE DEEP SOUTH (1978). 
62. Judge Jerry Smith, the author of the court's opinion, was appointed by President Reagan. 
See 2 Almanac of the Federal judiciary, Fifth Circuit 18. He was joined by Judges DeMoss and 
Weiner. both of whom were appointed by President Bush. See id. at 6, 20. 
63. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 934-35. 
64. [d. at 934. 
770 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31 
Texas is a state with an active Ku Klux Klan and regularly reported 
hate crimes against people of color.6s Texas only admitted Blacks to its law 
school when it was forced to do so by the United States Supreme Court in 
1950.66 As recently as 1960, the University of Texas segregated Mexican 
American students in campus housing and assigned them to a dormitory 
know as "the barracks." Until the mid 1960s, a Texas Board of Regents 
policy prohibited Blacks from living in or visiting white dorms.67 All of this 
was erased by the Fifth Circuit's willful disregard of the district court's 
detailed findings of fact. Adopting Powell's reasoning, they noted that the 
state did not have a compelling interest in remedying the present effects of 
societal discrimination,68 and that the district court erred in expanding the 
remedial justification to reach all public education within the state because 
that too was a "vague and amorphous" injury.69 
IV. Constitutionalizing White Power 
The second troublesome feature of Powell's Bakke opinion is his argu-
ment that the attainment of a diverse student body is compelling because it 
furthers the university's First Amendment right of academic freedom.70 The 
First Amendment protects a university faculty'S right to determine the con-
tent of the curriculum and which students will best contribute to the 
achievement of those pedagogic goals.71 This argument constitutionalizes 
65. See THE Ku KLUX KLAN: A HISTORY OF RACISM AND VIOLENCE (Sandra Bullard, ed., 
4th ed. 1991); see also KLANWATCH: INTELLIGENCE REPORT, Aug. 1995, at 19 (Southern Poverty 
Law Center) (reporting on hate crimes, rallies, and other activities engaged in by the Klan and 
other like minded organizations from all around the country); see id. Feb. 1996, at 4, 5, 14, 15 
(showing active KKK groups in Texas). 
66. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
67. See Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 555 (W.O. Tex. 1994). 
68. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 949. 
69. See id. at 950. 
70. The Court stated that: 
The fourth goal asserted by petitioner is the attainment of a diverse student body. This is 
clearly a constitutionaUy permissible goal for an institution of higher education. Aca-
demic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated constitutional right, long has been 
viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment. The freedom of a university to 
make its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its student body. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12. 
71. The Court held that: 
It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to 
speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail "the 
four essential freedoms" of a university-to determine for itself on academic grounds 
who may teach, what may be taught, how it shaU be taught, and who may be admitted to 
study 
Id. at 312 (citing Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957». 
Powell's argument focuses on curriculum and teaching, but his argument applies as well to a 
faculty's right to determine the content of research and scholarship. If a faculty decides that the 
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the power of a privileged educational establishment to determine what 
learning shall be valued and who shall be taught. University faculties, ad-
ministrations, and boards of trustees continue to be dominated by white 
males.72 Under Justice Powell's analysis, these white males have a constitu-
tional right to determine, based on ideas and values widely shared by that 
privileged group, who will gain access to knowledge and power. Thus, a 
racially diverse student body is a compelling interest for only as long as 
those who run the school think it SO.73 Powell's reasoning could as easily 
justify an all white school as one that is racially diverse.74 
Of course, in the context of the Bakke case, the faculty's goal of 
achieving a racially diverse student body was in pursuit of the pedagogical 
goal of teaching students about the racially divided world in which they 
live. Powell's opinion makes clear that what is often euphemistically called 
"race relations" is what must be learned in the academy.75 However, the 
same opinion rejects the purpose of remedying "societal discrimination" as 
too "amorphous";76 yet surely we learn race relations in pursuit of that 
amorphous goal. 
How does one explain this contradiction? Powell could not admit that 
racism in America was still concrete and real without abandoning the 
Court's commitment to legal formalism and the big lie. Nonetheless, he had 
heard Archibald Cox's prophetic warning at oral argument that if the Court 
forbade any consideration of race, our universities would become once 
study of race relations, the culture or history of African Americans, or the epidemiology of dis-
eases affecting certain minority communities are important intellectual or scientific endeavors, 
then they should also have the right to determine which individuals, or what combinations of 
individuals, will be best qualified to serve those academic goals. 
72. Federal Glass Ceiling Commission, Good/or Business: Making Full Use o/the Nation's 
Hurrum Capital, March, 1995 (Bureau of National Affairs) (finding that 85 percent of tenured 
professors are white and male). 
73. If the First Amendment right to academic freedom protected the California Board of 
Regents decision to use race as one factor to achieve a racially diverse student body in 1979, it 
equally protects the decision to repeal those affirmative action programs seventeen years later by a 
Board that did not view the racial integration of the university's student body as a high priority. 
74. There is nothing in Powell's analysis to explain why a faculty that is ideologically com-
mitted to white supremacy could not successfully assert its First Amendment right to protect a 
decision to admit only white students to its university. Cf Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 
U.S. 574 (1983) (holding that the IRS may deny tax-exempt status-normally accorded charitable 
organizations that serve a public interest and do not act in ways contrary to public policy-to an 
institution that racially discriminates). Bob Jones argued, unsuccessfully, that its racially discrimi-
natory policy was mandated by its religious beliefs and that the IRS's denial was a violation of its 
First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. See id. at 602. 
75. Thus, for Powell, it was appropriate to consider race in admissions. See 438 U.S. at 
316-18. The Court appended information from the Harvard College Admissions Program, stating 
the need "to bring to their classmates and to each other the variety of points of view, backgrounds 
and experiences of blacks in the United States." Id. at 323 (Powell, J., appendix to opinion). 
76. Id. at 307. 
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again virtually all white.?7 Powell believed Cox, and he believed the young 
people who had shouted loud and clear that they knew they belonged inside 
the university's gates and they would not go back to the days of legal segre-
gation. Justice Powell gave half the baby to the unreality of legal formalism 
and half to the political pragmatism of legal realism. But, dividing the baby 
is never a just solution. When the argument for racial diversity is grounded 
in the faculty's speech rights, affirmative action is divorced from it's true 
purpose: anti-racism. We are in danger of losing sight of that important 
goal. 
Again, the Fifth Circuit opinion in Hopwood provides an example of 
how a substanceless definition of diversity undermines what ought be af-
firmative action's true purpose. The court of appeals argued that intervening 
precedent required them to reject diversity as a compelling interest.78 The 
77. That Cox's warning was prophetic is borne out by the admissions statistics at the Uni-
versity of Texas Law School at Austin in the year immediately after the Fifth Circuit's Hopwood 
decision went into effect. Similarly drastic statistics resulted at the University of California law 
schools at Berkeley and Los Angeles in the wake of the University of California Regent's decision 
to end affirmative action in admissions in the California system. At UCLA only 21 black students 
were admitted to the first year class entering law school in 1997-an 80 percent drop from the 
year before and "the lowest number of African Americans offered admission since 1970." Rene 
Sanchez & Sue Anne Pressley, Minority Admissions Fall With Preference Ban, WASH. POST, May 
19, 1997, at AI. At U.C. Berkeley's Boalt Hall, 14 Blacks were accepted, but they all declined. 
The entering law school class at Boalt will have exactly one black student-a student who had 
deferred admission from the previous year. See Saundra Torry, ABA Leader Criticizes Admissions 
Policies, WASH. POST, Aug. 5,1997, at A7. A similar situation prevails at the University of Texas 
Law School. As of July 6, the law school had received tuition deposits from 468 students, only 26 
of whom are Hispanic, and four of whom are Black. See Black. Latino Enrollment Plunges at 
Texas Law School, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1997, at A18. The fall in minority enrollment is of 
sufficient concern to prompt a Department of Education investigation into the "colorblind" admis-
sion policy in the University of California system to see whether it discriminates against minori-
ties. See also Ken Chavez, Probe of Possible UC Bias, SACRAMENTO BEE, July IS, 1997, at AI; 
Kenneth R. Weiss, UC Law Schools' New Rules Cost Minorities Spots. L.A. TIMES. May 15. 
1997. at AI. 
The declining enrollment of minorities is equally dismaying at some of the University of 
California medical schools, the original battle ground of the Bakke decision. Out of 196 black 
applicants to the U.C. San Diego medical school. none got in. See Two UC Medical Incoming 
Classes Have No Blacks. S.F. CHRON., Aug. I, 1997, at AI. Out of 171 black applicants to U.C. 
Irvine, one got in, but will attend Davis. See id. That means that two U.C. medical schools will 
have no black students at all in their first year classes. See also No Blacks Make UCSD Med 
School, S.F. EXAMINER, July 31, 1997, at A2. 
78. See 78 F.3d at 944-45 (noting that no other justice joined the portion of Powell's opin-
ion that relied on the diversity rational and that Adarand had overruled Metro Broad. Inc. v. 
F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547 (1990), where the Court relied on Powell's diversity argument to uphold an 
FCC affirmative action program). The Fifth Circuit went on to quote Justice O'Connor's dissent in 
Metro Broadcasting which it argued had been vindicated by the Court's Adarand decision: "Mod-
ern equal protection has recognized only one compelling state interest: remedying the effects of 
[past] discrimination." 78 F.3d. at 945 (quoting Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 612 (O'Connor, 
J., dissenting». Cf Amar & Katyal, supra note 27, at 1761 (arguing that Justice O'Connor's 
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court then went on to offer its own rationale for rejecting Justice Powell's 
argument. Race as a means of achieving diversity of ideas, values, or beliefs 
assumed that a certain individual possessed characteristics, "by virtue of 
being a member of a certain racial group," that properly related to the 
faculty's academic freedom.79 "To believe that a person's race controls his 
point of view is to stereotype him."80 This argument, that using race as a 
Metro Broadcasting dissent "only repudiated an extension of Bakke beyond the education 
context"). 
79. 78 F.3d at 946. 
80. [d. In support of this proposition, the court relies on another conservative appellate 
judge, stating: 'The use of a racial characteristic to establish a presumption that the individual also 
possesses other, and socially relevant, characteristics, exemplifies, encourages, and legitimizes the 
mode of thought and behavior that underlies most prejudice and bigotry in modem America." 
Richard A. Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Ra-
cial Minorities, 1974 SUP. CT. REv. 12 (1974); see also Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion in 
Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 615 (expressing concern about the FCC licensing scheme that 
operated by "identifying what constitutes a 'black viewpoint,' an 'Asian viewpoint,' an 'Arab 
viewpoint,' and so on ... "). This anti-essentialist argument is also a favorite of conservatives of 
color who oppose affirmative action. See, e.g., STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AmRMA-
TrvE ACTION BABY (1991). In this book, Carter recounts his own ambivalence as a beneficiary of 
affirmative action programs, and criticizes what he terms the "diversity movement" for arguing 
that people of color should be valued "specially because of the nature of oppression in [their] 
history." [d. at 209. He takes issue with the concept that the views and opinions of minorities must 
by definition be different than those of whites, and worries that an emphasis on the unique voice 
of minorities means that those members of minority communities who hold more "white" view-
points will be denounced as unauthentic, or worse traitorous. See id. at 99-123; SHELBY STEELE, 
THE CONTENT OF OUR CHARACfER 172 (1990) (arguing that Black identity is "a skin that needs 
shedding," as it induces Blacks to define themselves as perpetual victims, saps the initiative of the 
Black community, and overall has a profoundly demoralizing effect); see also Randall L. Ken-
nedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1745 (1989) (critiquing the works 
of legal scholars such as Derrick Bell, Richard Delgado, and Marl Matsuda, and opposing the 
emphasis he perceives these authors place on the value of minority scholarship as representing a 
unique and crucial perspective that can only be supplied by people of color). 'The strategy of 
elevating racial status to an intellectual credential undermines the conception of intellectual merit 
as a mark of achieved distinction by confusing the relationship between racial background and 
scholarly expertise." [d. at 1805; see also Linda Chavez, Racial Justice: Changing the Tune, 
LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 26, 1994, at 18 (arguing that preferential policies and affirmative action only 
exacerbate race relations in the country, because of increased White resentment, and stigmatiza-
tion of the minority beneficiaries of such programs); Randall Kennedy, My Race Problem-and 
Ours, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 1997, at 55, 66 (arguing that Blacks should not embrace racial 
loyalty any more than Whites should, because it is as wrong for Blacks to favor other Blacks for 
purely racial reasons as it is for Whites to favor other Whites for purely racial reasons); cf MARl 
MATSUDA, WHERE Is YOUR BODY?: AND OTHER EsSAYS ON RACE, GENDER, AND THE LAW xi 
(1996) ("Who I am in relation to the historical forces that constrain my choices and options is 
critical to my understanding of law and justice. This is not the same as saying, in a deterministic 
or simplistic way, that identity is fixed, that it is everything, or that it is an end in itself."); see also 
LAWRENCE & MATSUDA, supra note I, at 225; Angela P. Harris, Symposium: Critical Race The-
ory-Foreword: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. REv. 741 (1994). Matsuda, 
Lawrence, and Harris argue that not all forms of group identification are essentialist and advocat-
ing those forms of identity politics that create individual agency by recognizing the ways in which 
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proxy for point of veiw essentializes and stereotypes individuals admitted 
under affirmative action programs as well as those white individuals who 
are consequently denied admissions, is premised on Powell's argument that 
the university seeks racial diversity to diversify points of view rather than 
learning about and combating a particular idea: "white supremacy." If the 
university admits African American students to diversify "points of 
view" -which, in the context of the First Amendment, implies differing 
politics or ideology-then, the Fifth Circuit argued, the implication must be 
that all Blacks think alike. 
If the university admits non-white students for the specific purpose of 
teaching all students about the social reality of racism, then the black stu-
dents' presence in the classroom and community is valued because they 
have experienced racism as persons defined as inferior by that ideology. In 
this context, "point of view" implies perspective vis-a-vis the object to be 
studied: American racism.81 The assumption here is not that members of a 
certain racial group will share an ideology, but that members of a non-white 
racial group will have experienced white supremacy differently than whites 
and will therefor possess a different knowledge of American racism. 82 
In short, when the First Amendment justification for diversity-aca-
demic conversation-is separated from the substantive content of that con-
versation-learning about the social reality of racism-it is not apparent 
why race should be a factor in deciding who should participate in that con-
versation. "What does the color of an individual's skin matter in a discus-
sion of quantum physics?" is the paradigm rhetorical question posed by 
affirmative action's opponents.83 When racism is our topic of study, it be-
race is socially constructed and using oppositional social constructions of race to fight racism's 
group defamation. 
8!. See Charles R. Lawrence Ill, The Word and the River: Pedagogy as Scholarship as 
Struggle, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 2231 (1992) (discussing the importance of positioned perspective to 
the insights of the work of minority scholars and teachers); see also PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE 
ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 6 (1991) (discussing "purposeful doublevoicedness"); Mari J. 
Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOo 
MEN'S RTS. L. REp. 7 (1989) (urging lawyers to see the world from the standpoint of the oppressed 
and to maintain multiple consciousness as a way of transferring the details of our own special 
knowledge to the standard jurisprudential discourse); Martha Minow The Supreme Court, 1986 
Tenn-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REv. 10 (1987) (exploring attempts by the 
Supreme Court to seek the perspective of persons with different backgrounds and urging a contin-
ual search from unheard points of view). 
82. When the Object of study is racism, race is no longer what the Fifth Circuit referred to as 
a "proxy" for a socially relevant characteristic. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 946. Race is the socially 
relevant characteristic. 
83. Of course, the answer to this question is not self evident. It may well be that the actual 
scientific theory is racially neutral, but even scientists work in a world where race is not irrelevant. 
For example, was the role that racism played in the choice of the victims of the nuclear bombs 
dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki a relevant ethical issue for the scientists who created the 
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comes clear that we must include participants who have experienced racism 
from the bottom as well as the top.84 
v. The Deeper Meaning of Diversity 
When racial diversity's purpose is anti-racism or, more inclusively, 
anti-subordination, its defense is clear. Solving what Du Bois called "the 
problem of the twentieth century"85 is still among our most pressing and 
perilous concerns as we enter the twenty-first century. Certainly a univer-
sity is justified, and I would argue morally and constitutionally obligated, to 
center its pedagogy and research around disestablishing white supremacist 
structures and ideologies. Once we acknowledge the continuing existence 
of racism and commit ourselves to its disestablishment, the applicant who 
has been identified and treated by the society as a subordinated racial mi-
nority will bring to that freedom fighting enterprise a life experience that 
makes her peculiarly qualified for the task. 
This is not to say that she will have the same qualifications as every 
other person who shares her racial identity, nor will she have the same point 
of view.86 What she does share with all of her brothers and sisters of color 
is a lifetime experience as a person of color in a racist society. No white 
person has this qualification. 
In addition to the qualification of experience, the minority applicant 
will have the qualifications of motivation and commitment to the fight 
against racism.87 While everyone is harmed by the damage racism does to 
bomb? Should not the chemists. biologists, geologists, and engineers who study and work with 
environmental pollutants be concerned with how racism may affect their use and disposal? 
84. See Mari Matsuda. Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations. 22 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 323. 324-26. 
85. W.E.B. Du BOIS. SOULS OF BLACK FOLK xxxi (Bantam Books 1989) (1903). 
86. Justice Powell recognized that one reason for admitting significant numbers of Blacks 
was "to bring to their classmates and to each other the variety of points of view. backgrounds and 
experiences of blacks in the United States." Bakke. 438 U.S. at 323 (Powell, J., appendix to 
opinion). See also Amar & Katyal. supra note 27, at 1763 n.87 (arguing that a proper application 
of Powell's diversity interest "does not assume that there is, say, only one way to be black"). 
Amar & Katyal note that "[a] critical mass of students of a particular group may be needed so that 
other students become aware of the group (and of the diversity within the group)." [d. at 1777. I 
have been the only black faculty member teaching at a law school on more than one occasion, and 
I can testify from personal experience to the benefits that accrue to my colleagues, my students, 
and myself. by being one of seven tenured African American faculty currently teaching at Ge-
orgetown instead of a sole black face representing every African American in all I say and do. 
87. The phenomena of internalized racism or false consciousness on the part of victims of 
racial subordination will mean that not all people of color will be equally well qualified in this 
regard. Some persons of color will be motivated to accommodate to oppression or even to collabo-
rate with their oppressor. See JOHN DOLLARD, CASTE AND CLASS IN A SOUTHERN TOWN 255 
(Doubleday, 3rd ed. 1957) (1937) (writing of a similar accommodation among some Blacks in his 
study). "It may come to pass in the end that the unwelcome force is idealized, that one identifies 
776 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31 
our social fabric and our souls, the injury that racism does to racial minori-
ties is concrete, immediate, personal, and unceasing. When Asian American 
students in Professor Mari Matsuda's class on Asian Americans and Legal 
Ideology read the most recent figures on the alarming increase in hate 
crimes against Asians, they saw more than statistics.88 They were suddenly 
conscious of their own vulnerability and of their fears for their families' 
safety. 
African American students know first hand the look that crosses the 
face of the interviewer from the downtown law firm, a look that tells them 
there will be no call back, no matter how bright and charming and non-
threatening they might be. The white colleague who compliments the Latina 
Stanford Law School graduate on her facility with English may be unaware 
that his words are a reflection of America's racism, but she will feel the 
presence of the color line that separates the two of them. Black, Asian, 
Latino, and Native American students have no choice but to fight racism, 
because not to fight is to deny one's self. 
One of my white colleagues, as part of his criminal justice class, 
showed a video of an actual police interrogation and confession. At the end 
of the tape he asked the class for a show of hands indicating whether or not 
they thought the confession was coerced. The students were shocked to find 
that the vote was divided along racial lines. Almost all of the white students 
thought the confession was coerced. All of the students of color thought it 
voluntary. A student in the class reported that, following the vote, you could 
cut the tension in the room with a knife. For a skillful teacher like my 
colleague, this was a learning moment. It is a moment that will never take 
place in the segregated classrooms of a world without affirmative action. 
with it and takes it into the personality; it sometimes even happens that what is at first resented 
and feared is finally loved." [d. I am not arguing here that race should be used as a proxy for 
motivation, but that race should be a factor because the sources of motivation for people of color 
will be different. Both race and other indicators of commitment to the anti-racist struggle should 
be used in admissions. See also STANLEY M. ELKINS, SLAVERY: A PROBLEM IN AMERICAN INSTI-
TUTIONAL AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE (3rd ed. 1976) (arguing that oppression can cause its victims to 
seek the approval and love of their oppressors, to emulate them, and even to join them in perse-
cuting friends and family); FRANTZ FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH 148-205 (Constance 
Farrington trans., Grove Press 1966) (1963) (describing how readily the nascent, urban middle 
classes of newly independent countries. especially in Algeria. take on the role and privileges of the 
old colonial bourgeoisie by oppressing and exploiting the great mass of the people for their own 
personal profit). They maintain closer ties with the Western countries. who offer them wealth and 
prestige. than they do with the rural majorities of their own countries. from whom they remain 
extremely alienated. See id.; see also LAWRENCE & MATSUDA. supra note I. at 121-41 (discussing 
the black opponents of affirmative action). 
88. 1995 Audit of Violence Against Asian Pacific Americans: The Consequence of Intoler-
ance in America (3rd Annual Report. National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium. Aug. 
1996) at 1. 
Summer 1997] TRINA GRILLO SYMPOSIUM 777 
Although minorities are uniquely qualified to fight racism, I am not 
arguing that white students, faculty, lawyers, or judges do not also bring 
talents, skills, and values that are essential to the project of our common 
liberation. The fight against racism must, in the end, be an interracial col-
laboration. The struggle for affirmative action at the University of San Fran-
cisco and across the country has always included progressive whites, as did 
the abolitionist and anti-lynching movements, the freedom rides, and the 
liberation struggle in South Africa. This observation only reinforces the im-
portance of clearly articulating diversity's purpose. Once fighting racism 
becomes central to the university's mission, the measure of merit will 
change for whites as well. 
Thus, diversity is no longer a way of maintaining the status quo and 
protecting the power of those who are currently privileged. Instead, it be-
comes a means of redefining our educational mission and radically trans-
forming the university.89 
Several months ago, I went to see the film Rosewood,90 John Single-
ton's powerful depiction of the story of a small black town in Florida at-
tacked by a white mob. Beginning on New Year's Day, 1923, and for six 
days thereafter, a vigilante mob set fire to the houses of the town's thirty 
black families and shot or hung every black person they could find. The 
orgy of racial violence and lynching was sparked by a young white wo-
man's disputed story that she had been assaulted and beaten by a black 
intruder while her husband was away at work. It is a stunning and tragic 
story. But more than the horror and violence itself, I was struck by how 
intimately connected were the assailants and the assaulted-connected by 
their humanity and by their destiny to live in a world subsumed by the 
hateful ideology of white supremacy. I thought about how the legacy of a 
history ravaged by thousands of lynchings and burnings ties all of us to 
each other;91 how we are connected by the everyday violence of poverty, 
injustice, and the very color line that divides US.92 
89. See Charles R. Lawrence III, Symposium: Race and Remedy in a Multicultural Society-
Foreword: Race. Multiculturalism. and the Jurisprudence of Transformation, 47 STAN. L. REV. 
819 (1995). 
90. ROSEWOOD (Warner Bros. 1997). 
91. See Emma Coleman Jordan, The Power of False Racial Memory and the Metaphor of 
Lynching, in RACE, GENDER. AND POWER IN AMERICA: THE LEGACY OF THE HILL-THOMAS HEAR-
INGS 37 (Anita Faye Hill & Emma Coleman Jordan eds .• 1995); see also IDA B. WELLS, SOUTH-
ERN HORRORS: LYNCH LAW IN ALL ITs PHASES (1990, reprint of 1892 pamphlet, William Warren 
Katz, ed.); IDA B. WELLS-BARNETT, ON LYNCHINGS: SOUTHERN HORRORS; A RED RECORD; MOB 
RULE IN NEW ORLEANS (August Meier ed., Amo Press, 1969) (reprint of three 1890's pamphlets). 
92. See Mari Matsuda, Were You There? Witnessing Welfare Retreat, 31 U.S.F. L. REv. 
786-88 (1997). 
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If we are ever to heal ourselves, if we are ever to find reconciliation, 
we must confront this history and know how it lives with us today. It is no 
solution to deny it by calling it "amorphous." It will not do to pretend that 
diversity is only about free speech. The deeper meaning of diversity is that 
we must learn the truth from one another about our shared history and its 
legacy, and we cannot do that learning unless all of us are here. 
Paul Robeson, the extraordinary actor, singer, athlete, and radical 
political activist, who was also trained as a lawyer, was the inspiration for a 
poem by Gwendolyn Brooks that captures in a few short lines all that I have 
intended to say. The poem is titled "Paul Robeson." I think it also captures 
the spirit of Trina Grillo. . 
Paul Robeson 
That time 
we all heard it, 
cool and clear, 
cutting across the hot grit of the day. 
The major Voice. 
The adult Voice 
forgoing Rolling River, 
forgoing tearful tale of bale and barge 
and other symptoms of an old despond. 
Warning, in music-words 
devout and large, 
that we are each other's 
harvest: 
we are each other's 
business: 
we are each other's 
magnitude and bond.93 
93. GWENDOLYN BROOKS. BLACKS 496 (The David Company. 4th ed. 1989) (1945). 
